UIC Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 1

Article 11

Fall 2004

How to Keep the Lights On: An Exploration of the Abrogration of
Wholesale Energy Contracts, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 303 (2004)
Brian Bassett

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Legislation Commons, Natural
Resources Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons,
and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brian Bassett, How to Keep the Lights On: An Exploration of the Abrogration of Wholesale Energy
Contracts, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 303 (2004)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/11
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

HOW TO KEEP THE LIGHTS ON: AN
EXPLORATION OF THE ABROGATION OF
WHOLESALE ENERGY CONTRACTS
BRIAN BASSETT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

We use it constantly, every day of the year. When we work,
travel, even when we sleep, we rely on it for our livelihood and
well-being. Yet we seem only to appreciate its invisible presence
when it disappears from our lives. "We learn most about power
when we lose it and are left eating cereal by candlelight on the
front stoop. Or helping the waiter and the hairdresser and the
deaf man direct traffic at the intersection."' Rarely do we question
where this integral part of our lives comes from, or how it is even
created.
2
However, as a result of the energy crises in recent years, the
3
recent bankruptcies of giant energy corporations, and the massive
blackout on August 14, 2003, people have begun to ask questions
concerning the reliability of power supply and how it might
adversely affect them one day. 4 Specifically, they are looking at
* J.D. Candidate, May 2005; B.A. University of Dayton, 2002. The author
would like to thank John Ratnaswamy of Foley & Lardner for his continuous
guidance and assistance in the creation and development of this Comment. A
special thanks to Robert Bassett, Barbara Bassett and Stephany Avros for
their unwavering love and support throughout this process. Thank you also to
the entire John Marshall Law Review.
1. Nancy Gibbs, Lights Out, TIME, Aug. 25, 2003, at 31. On August 14,
2003, the northeastern United States, along with portions of Canada,
experienced the largest blackout in North American history. Id. at 31-32.
2. See Steven Ferrey, 2002 Energy Law Symposium: The Eagles of
Deregulation: The Role of the Courts in a Restructured Environment, 32
ENVTL. L. 297, 302 (2002) (concluding that California's rolling blackouts of
2001 pejoratively affected the social and political atmosphere of the time). See
also Alan Ramo, California'sEnergy Crisis-The Perils of Crisis Management
and a Challenge to Environmental Justice, 7 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1, 2
(2002) (suggesting that deregulation in California eventually resulted in
blackouts and an increase in electric bills).
3. See Jennifer Key, Developments in Regulatory Preemption in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, INFRASTRUCTURE, Summer 2003, at 7 (suggesting
that the recent bankruptcies of giant energy corporations are bringing electric
industry bankruptcy issues to the forefront of the energy sector).
4. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 37. The blackout of August 14, 2003 "affected
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governmental authorities for assurance that their lights will be
5
kept on.
One of the main reasons that reliability is being questioned is
the financial peril that many energy corporations find themselves
in today. 6 This Comment will explore two such companies and the
legal conflicts that arise as a result of questions of financial
survival, energy reliability, and legal predictability.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the emerging conflict
between energy suppliers and energy distributors by looking at
two contemporary examples of the issue. It will also review the
decisions made by the courts and regulatory agencies, along with
the legal authorities used to reach those decisions. Part II will
explore the resulting inconsistencies that specific cases have
brought to the forefront of the energy and legal communities by
highlighting the fundamental discrepancy between federal
bankruptcy law as governed by the Bankruptcy Code 7 and federal
energy regulatory laws laid out in the Federal Power Act.8 Part
III will propose that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") 9 obtain exclusive control in order to preclude any
conflicts surrounding the abrogation of executory electric supply
contracts.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The NRG Issue
On October 29, 1999, NRG Energy, Inc. ("NRG")1o entered
into a power sales agreement to provide energy to Connecticut
Light & Power ("CL&P") at a fixed price for four years.11 Despite a
eight states and 50 million people and could cost up to $5 billion." Id.
5. See generally id. (observing that numerous commercial sectors and
residential neighborhoods were frustrated with the fourth large-scale failure
of a power grid in the last decade).
6. Key, supra note 3, at 7.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000).
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824d.
9. FERC is a federal agency with powers delegated by Congress to
regulate the transmission of electricity as well as natural gas and oil through
interstate commerce. FERC, About FERC: What FERC Does, at
http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2004). FERC is
not empowered with the ability to regulate retail electricity sales to
consumers, nor is it responsible for the construction of electric facilities. Id.
10. NRG is the owner and operator of various power generating facilities,
including "competitive energy production and cogeneration facilities, thermal
energy production and energy resource recovery facilities." NRG Energy, Inc.
Files Voluntary Chapter 11 Petition to Implement Negotiated Restructuring
Plan, at http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/030514/145613_l.html (May 14, 2003)
[hereinafter NRG Files Voluntary Chapter 11].
11. NRG Energy, Inc. v. Blumenthal, No. 03 Civ. 3754, 2003 WL 21507685,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003). The contract required NRG to supply CL&P
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subsequent dispute over who would pay for certain congestion
charges, NRG provided energy service to CL&P on a consistent
basis until May 14, 2003, when it notified CL&P that it intended
12
to terminate the agreement based on CL&P's default. Later that
under Chapter 11 of the
day, NRG filed for bankruptcy protection
13
Code.
United States Bankruptcy
The original contract between NRG and CL&P represented a
disaster for NRG since it forced the energy company to sustain
14
The company filed for
losses of an estimated $500,000 per day.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in an attempt to mitigate the
already substantial financial damages it incurred as a result of its
contract with CL&P and a number of other energy supply
contracts.15 Filing for Chapter 11 was a practical solution as it
"often serves as an intermediate step offering a struggling
company the opportunity to become a viable entity or to be
with a fixed amount of energy from January 1, 2000 until December 31, 2003.
Id. The energy supplied by NRG is used by CL&P to serve forty five percent of
its customers. Connecticut Groups Ask FERC to Require NRG to Uphold
294
_l.html (July
CL&P Contract, at http://biz.yahoo.com/djus/030721/1852001
21, 2003).
12. NRG Energy, Inc., 2003 WL 21507685, at *1. The issue arising in the
case does not concern how, or even if, CL&P breached the contract in any
manner; this was only the initial explanation given by NRG in its attempt to
effectively terminate its duties under the original contract. Id.
13. NRG Files Voluntary Chapter 11, supra note 10. Chapter 11 filings,
used primarily by business debtors, function to allow a corporation to
1100.01
reorganize its business affairs. 7-1100 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
(15th ed. 2004). "Chapter 11 embodies a policy that it is generally preferable
to enable a debtor to continue to operate and to reorganize its business rather
Upon initiation of a
than simply to liquidate a troubled business." Id.
Chapter 11 claim, the debtor is protected by a stay of any third-party action to
collect any debt or property from the debtor. Id. The debtor is also provided
with the capacity "to use, sell, or lease property of the estate, even if the
property is subject to the interest of another entity." Id.
14. Judge Won't Stay FERC's Order Against NRG, at http://biz.yahoo.com/
rf/030630/energy_.nrg_2.html (June 30, 2003). It is worth noting that the
energy contract with CL&P was not the sole reason for NRG's substantial
financial problems. Instead, the debt accumulated over a five-year period as a
result of failed business ventures and acquisitions. NRG Files Voluntary
Chapter11, supra note 10.
15. See NRG Files Voluntary Chapter11, supra note 10 (suggesting that the
company's objective under Chapter 11 protection is to satisfy its debt with
creditors and restructure the company with a limited impact on its business
operations). Chapter 11 has been perceived as an essential tool to financially
desolate corporations because they would not have the capability of surviving
BRIAN A. BLUM, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTORI
liquidation bankruptcy.
Chapter 11 cases
EXPLANATIONS 463 (1993).
AND
CREDITOR, EXAMPLES
require the debtor to "file a schedule of assets and liabilities, a statement of
financial affairs, and a statement of executory contracts .... Id. Corporate
debtors are then required to compile a list of the twenty largest unsecured
creditors so that the United States Trustee can assemble a creditors'
committee. Id.
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acquired by a stronger participant."'16
Along with its Chapter 11 filing, NRG requested that the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York grant it the right to abrogate the energy supply contract with
CL&P before the established termination date. 17 NRG claimed
that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly gave it the authority to take
this action. 18
In a separate proceeding, the Connecticut Attorney General
successfully requested that FERC delay NRG's termination of the
contract in order to maintain the power supply in the area. 19
Realizing the possible adverse effects of NRG's action, CL&P
intervened in order to protect its own interests in the action. 20
Following hearings, and without taking any action regarding
FERC's declaration, the bankruptcy court found that the character
for the contract satisfied the standards for rejection and

16. John F. Lomax, Jr., Future Electric Utility Bankruptcies:Are They on
the Horizon and What Can We Learn from Public Service Co. of New
Hampshire'sExperience?, 12 BANKR. DEv. J. 535, 535 (1996). This Comment
suggests that the overall pursuit of competition (as was the case with
deregulation in the energy industry) often results in fewer industry
participants as a result of mergers or acquisitions. Filing for Chapter 11
protection, as NRG did here, will allow a company to stay financially afloat
until they unilaterally recover or are saved by another market participant. Id.
17. NRG Energy, Inc., 2003 WL 21507685, at *1. Among other things, NRG
requested that the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York enjoin the Connecticut attorney general from requesting FERC to
take any action regarding the contract and it also requested that the court
stay any declaration requiring NRG to comply with a FERC order. Id.
18. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (providing that "the trustee, subject to the
court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor").
19. NRG Energy, Inc., 2003 WL 21507685, at *1. FERC did not effectively
eliminate NRG's ability to terminate the energy supply contract; instead, it
only delayed such a final decision until it had sufficient time to evaluate the
merit and subsequent consequences of the proposed abrogation. Blumenthal
v. NRG Power Mktg., Inc., No. EL03-123-000, 2003 WL 21130626 (F.E.R.C.
May 16, 2003) (order requiring compliance with contract).
20. NRG Energy, Inc., 2003 WL 21507685, at *2. In its motion to intervene,
CL&P predicted NRG's forthcoming argument suggesting that FERC lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case at hand. Motion to Intervene and Comments of
the Connecticut Light and Power Company in Support of FERC's Jurisdiction
over Filed Rate Schedule at 1, Blumenthal v. NRG Power Marketing, Inc.,
2003 WL 21130626 (F.E.R.C. May 16, 2003) (No. EL03-123-000). CL&P then
went on to assert that the contract at issue was a rate schedule, putting it
within the purview of FERC. Id. at 2. CL&P claimed that NRG's actions
amounted to nothing more than a dissatisfied party who was attempting to be
"relieved of its improvident bargain." Id. at 4 (citing Fed. Power
Comm'n v.
Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) (holding that a contract rate is
not unreasonable and the Commission should not alter the contractual terms
in any way simply because the contract "yields less than a fair return on the
net invested capital")).
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21
CL&P
subsequently approved the rejection of the contract.
the
that
claiming
appealed the decision of the bankruptcy court
the
with
deal
that
court does not have jurisdiction over contracts
22
solely
was
it
that
claimed
Instead, CL&P
wholesale of energy.
23
The
within FERC's jurisdiction to make such a declaration.
the
for
Court
District
conflict came before the United States
issue
the
addressed
Southern District of New York, which
regarding "the interrelationship of bankruptcy and federal energy
regulatory laws and whether the proper authority to address the
issues raised here is a federal district court or FERC-with a
subsequent appeal of a FERC order lying with a court of
24
appeals."
The court sided with CL&P, holding that this area of law is
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of FERC as directed by the
Federal Power Act.25 Consequently, it prohibited NRG from

21. NRG Energy, Inc., 2003 WL 21507685, at *2. The court found that the
essence of the contract satisfied the "business judgment standard for rejection
of an executory contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365." Id. See In re Tilco, Inc. 558
F.2d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that the decision of whether an
executory contract is to be rejected or upheld is one of "business judgment" for
the court). See also King v. Baer, 482 F.2d 552, 557 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding
that "[t]he law is clear that before an executory contract should be rejected, a
judicial hearing and inquiry, at which interested parties might be heard,
should be held, and that an executory contract could be rejected only with the
permission of the court"). A bankruptcy court implements this standard by
looking at the executory contract itself along with any surrounding
circumstances, and then it uses its best business judgment to see if the
termination would be beneficial or harmful for the estate if the parties were
forced to continue with the contract. Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime
Networks, 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993). It is the bankruptcy court's duty
to accept a debtor's decision to reject an executory contract pursuant to the
business judgment rule, unless it is determined that the debtor's decision is
unreasonable and based on "bad faith, or whim or caprice." Lubrizol Enters.,
Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985). In
general, the effect of the termination on the counterparty is not a material
issue in deciding whether the rejection is proper. In re T.W.A. Airlines, Inc.,
261 B.R. 103, 123 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
22. The sale of energy at wholesale explicitly means the "sale of electric
energy to any person for resale." 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).
23. NRG Energy, Inc., 2003 WL 21507685, at *2 n.2. Specifically, the
appeal stated that the authority to modify such energy contracts lies within
FERC's exclusive jurisdiction as indicated by the Federal Power Act. Motion
to Intervene and Comments of the Connecticut Light and Power Company in
Support of FERC's Jurisdiction over Filed Rate Schedule at 1-2 Blumenthal v.
NRG Power Mktg., Inc., 2003 WL 21130626 (F.E.R.C. May 16, 2003) (No.
EL03-123-000).
24. NRG Energy, Inc., 2003 WL 21507685, at *2.
25. Id. at *4.The court held that "the business of... selling electric energy
for ultimate distribution is affected with a public interest.., and that Federal
regulation of... the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is
necessary in the public interest .... Id. at *3 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)).
Therefore, the Federal Power Act grants jurisdiction over the sale of wholesale
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terminating its service agreement as originally allowed by the
bankruptcy court. 26 NRG subsequently requested and received a
rehearing concerning FERC's order to continue supplying energy
pursuant to the contract. 27 Before that issue could be officially
adjudicated in court, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement that provided for the continuance of service with some
alterations in the contractual terms, leaving the jurisdictional
28
quandary unresolved.
B. The Mirant Issue
Similar
to
NRG,
Mirant
Corporation
('Wirant"),
headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, is a producer and seller of

energy in interstate commerce to FERC.
Nanthala Power & Light v.
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986). In the present case, the court held, the
contract between NRG and CL&P was designated as a wholesale power
contract and was therefore subject to FERC's jurisdiction. NRG Energy, Inc.,
2003 WL 21507685, at *3. The court unequivocally rejected NRG's contention
that the contract represented a simple bankruptcy issue that involved a
financial agreement between two parties. Id.
The court held that the
regulatory paradigm of such cases removes it from the general bankruptcy
sphere and into the realm of FERC's established authority. Id.
26. Id. at *4.
The court held that FERC does not have to justify its
decisions to the bankruptcy court because it obtained sole jurisdiction in the
case. Id. at *3. If any party was offended by a FERC order, then the proper
procedure would involve filing for a review of that order in the United States
Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the debtor found himself. Id. at *4.
27. Request for Rehearing and Clarification of NRG Power Marketing Inc.
at 1, Blumenthal v. NRG Power Mktg., Inc., 2003 WL 21480251 (F.E.R.C. June
25, 2003) (Nos. EL03-123-001, EL03-134-000, EL03-129-000, EL03-135-000
(not consolidated)).
NRG's request plainly accuses FERC of incorrectly
requiring NRG to continue to supply power pursuant to the original contract
despite the bankruptcy court's ruling to the contrary. Id. NRG then asked
FERC to do one of three things: (1) completely terminate the proceedings
before it, thereby granting the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the case; (2)
find that NRG has satisfied the 'Mobile-Sierra public interest test" and should
therefore be free from the original agreement; or (3) find that, according to the
facts at issue, NRG had a right to terminate the contract with CL&P. Id. at 2.
FERC has the authority, under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, to alter the rates
set out by a contractual provision only if it is required by the public interest.
Exxon Corp. v. FERC, 206 F.3d 47, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The purpose of the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine is "to strike a balance between private contractual
rights and the regulatory power to modify contracts when necessary to protect
the public interest." Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 689 (1st
Cir. 1995). Circumstances which may implicate the protections of the MobileSierra standard involve those cases where "the rate might impair the financial
ability of the utility to continue to supply electricity, force electricity
consumers to bear an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory." Id. at
690.
28. NRG to Continue Supplying Connecticut Light and Power, THE
HARTFORD CoURANT, Nov. 7, 2003, at E2. The settlement between the parties
required an alteration in the contract rate price, but it did not force the
customers to pay a higher rate. Id.
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electricity in the energy industry. 29 In 2000, Mirant purchased
four energy-producing power plants from Potomac Electric Power
Company ("Pepco"). 30 The agreement required Mirant to provide
31
Pepco with all the electricity it needed to service its customers.
to provide energy to a
Mirant was also contractually bound
32
number of other energy corporations.
Mirant, much like NRG, incurred a number of financial
33
problems as a result of its contractual obligations. As of July 10,
2003, the company had $8.9 billion in debt, but hoped to refinance
34
However, Mirant quickly
without having to file bankruptcy.
realized its dire business status and, following in 35the steps of
NRG, filed for Chapter 11 protection on July 14, 2003.
29. We've Got the Power, at http://www.mirant.com/

(Sept. 26, 2003).

Mirant is involved in the energy industry in North America, the Caribbean,
and the Philippines. Id. The corporation possesses over 21,000 megawatts of
electric generating capacity on a global level. Id.
30. Kristen McNamara, Mirant Could Further Test Co.'s Ability to Shed
Contracts, at http://biz.yahoo.com/djus/030716/2037001711_l.html (July 16,
2003). The details of the power supply agreement have not been disclosed, but
records show that Pepco has committed about $615 million per year to Mirant.
Id. Merrill Lynch found that Pepco pays approximately thirty-four dollars per
megawatt-hour to Mirant, which is much less that the amount Mirant would
be able to collect on the wholesale market. Id.
31. Id. Mirant entered into two separate fixed price service contracts with
Pepco, one for service to Maryland and the other to Washington. Id. The
contract for service to Maryland runs until June 2004 and the service to the
Washington area terminates in January of 2005. Id. Mirant also entered into
a contract to pay Pepco for electricity provided to Pepco pursuant to power
contract with numerous third parties. Pepco Responds to Mirant's Move to
Cancel Pepco Agreements and Block FERC Review, at http://www.
pepcoholdings.com/news/newsrelease_26.html (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter
Pepco Responds to Mirant'sMove].
32. See Objection of Boston Edison Company, Cambridge Electric Light
Company, Commonwealth Electric Company, and NSTAR Gas Company to
Debtors' Motion for an Order Pursuant to Section 365 and 554 of the
Bankruptcy Code Authorizing and Approving a Procedure for the Rejection of
Certain Executory Contracts at 4, In re Mirant Corp., 43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 119
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (No. 03-46590-DML-11) (indicating that there are a
number of other energy corporations that have encountered Mirant's attempt
to abrogate an existing energy service contract, such as Boston Edison
Company, Cambridge Electric Light Company, Commonwealth Electric
Company, and NSTAR Gas Company).
File for Bankruptcy, at
to
Says Mirant Likely
33. Analyst
http://biz.yahoo.com/rc/030710/utilitiesmirant_1.html (July 10, 2003).
34. Id. While Mirant aspired to restructure its debt out of court, it also
realized that there was a good possibility that it would have to file for Chapter
11 protection as indicated by its request to bondholders and bank lenders to
approve a prepackaged bankruptcy plan. Id.
35. Press Release, Mirant Corporation, Mirant Files Chapter 11 Petitions
to Facilitate Financial Restructuring (July 14, 2003), available at
http://www.corporate-ir.netlireye/ir-site.zhtml?ticker=MIR&script=
416&layout=O&item -id=431070. When Mirant filed for bankruptcy on July
14, 2003, they held $20.6 billion in assets countered with $11.4 billion in debt,
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Understanding its need to minimize its mounting debt,
Mirant immediately explored the option of rejecting some of its
executory contracts. 36 The company paid close attention to NRG's
emerging court battle, as its own situation appeared to parallel
that of NRG.37 Mirant eventually decided to take action on August
28, 2003, by filing a motion requesting that the energy company be
allowed to reject its duties delineated by its contract with Pepco. 38
Mirant also moved to abrogate a number of executory contracts
with other energy supply companies. 39

amounting to the 10th largest bankruptcy by assets in United States history.
Mirant Files 10th Largest Bankruptcy, at http://money.excite.com/
ht.nw/bus/20030715/hle-bus-n15228270.html (July 15, 2003). The primary
causes of Mirant's exorbitant financial problems were "[flailing power prices
and overly ambitious expansion plan ....
McNamara, supra note 30. As
impressive as it may seem, Mirant's bankruptcy filing paled in comparison to
Enron's massive Chapter 11 filing of $63 billion. Ken Silverstein, Mirant
Collapses, at http://www.gasandoil.comgoc/company/cnn33489.htm (July 17,
2003).
36. Silverstein, supra note 35. Experts immediately predicted that Mirant
would encounter the same problems that NRG did if it tried to abrogate any of
its current contracts. Id.
37. See NRG Power Contract Seen Affecting Other Bankruptcy Firms, at
http://biz.yahoo.comrc/030721/utilities-nrg-l.html (July 21, 2003) (suggesting
that if NRG is permitted to abrogate its contract with CL&P, a number of
other bankrupt energy corporations would most likely follow suit).
38. Pepco Responds to Mirant's Move, supra note 31. Mirant filed in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas requesting
only to abrogate the contract that required them to reimburse Pepco; it did not
attempt to reject the contracts that required Mirant to provide power at a
fixed price to Pepco. Id. Mirant requested that the court allow it to reject the
contract on five business day's written notice to Pepco. Objection of Boston
Edison Company, Cambridge Electric Light Company, Commonwealth
Electric Company, and NSTAR Gas Company to Debtors' Motion for an Order
Pursuant to Section 365 and 554 of the Bankruptcy Code Authorizing and
Approving a Procedure for the Rejection of Certain Executory Contracts at 4,
In re Mirant Corp., 43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (No. 0346590). If Mirant was granted the right to abrogate the contract, Pepco would
then be forced to purchase energy from the market, which would effectively
eliminate its chances of purchasing power at a price where it would be able to
make a profit upon sale to its customers. Mirant Could Further Test Co.'s
Ability to Shed Contracts, at http://biz.yahoo.com/djus/030716/2037001711
_l.html (July 16, 2003) [hereinafter Mirant Tests Ability to Shed Contracts].
39. Mirant Tests Ability to Shed Contracts, supra note 38. Countering
Mirant's motion, the energy supply companies involved claimed that
permitting Mirant to take such action would not only be unreasonably harmful
towards their interests, but it also would have the potential to leave certain
utility customers with a limited ability to obtain energy without high energy
replacement costs. Id. These companies also argued that the executory
contracts at issue were subject to FERC's exclusive jurisdiction as indicated by
the Federal Power Act. Id. To provide direct support to their proposition, the
energy supply companies cited the decision in the NRG case which held that
whether or not to allow the rejection of such executory contracts was only to be
left to FERC. Id.
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In a significant move, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Texas issued a temporary restraining order that
prohibited Pepco from initiating any claim before FERC regarding
the contract termination. 40 The order also temporarily enjoined
FERC from taking any action that would require Mirant to
41
continue to abide by the terms of its original contract with Pepco.
Pepco and FERC responded by requesting that the district court
remove jurisdiction to hear the case. 42 While the case was
pending, Mirant and Pepco entered into a settlement agreement
that effectively eliminated the portion of the contracts that
required Mirant to supply Pepco with energy at below-market
prices. 43 The settlement alleviated some of the financial pressure
on Mirant by boosting energy prices while maintaining reliable
at the same price they were
electricity service to retail customers
44
paying prior to the settlement.
The dispute concerning the portion of the agreement that
required Mirant to assume Pepco's purchase contracts with other
45
energy corporations continued on its path to the district court.
In its opinion resolving the issue, the court cited numerous cases
and statutes that supported FERC's jurisdictional claim, including
the district court's opinion in In re NRG Energy, Inc. 46 The Texas
district court held that the statutory provisions of the FPA make
any filed rate change subject to FERC's approval, and that an
appropriate appeal of that FERC decision lies with a federal court

40. Pepco Responds to Mirant's Move, supra note 31.
41. Id. This portion of the order was the most significant, as it attempted
to preemptively prohibit the same type of obstruction that NRG encountered
in its attempt to terminate its contract with CL&P.
42. Press Release, Pepco Holdings, Inc., Pepco, FERC Seek Federal Court
Intervention in Mirant Case (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://www.
pepcoholdings.com/news/news-release_27.html. The parties sought resolution
of the conflict in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas. Id.
43. Debtors' Motion for Approval of (1) Settlement Agreement Under
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019, (2) Allowed, Prepetition General
Unsecured Claims by Pepco in the Amount of $105 Million Against Each of
Mirant and MAEM, and (3) Assumption of Certain Transition Power
Agreements, In re Mirant (No. 03-46590-DML-11). The October 27, 2003
settlement agreement set out a number of things-most importantly it
maintained the service that Mirant would provide but altered the pricing
structure to allow the companies to continue to provide power to consumers.
Id.
44. Press Release, Mirant Corporation, Mirant and Pepco Reach Settlement
on Electricity Supply Contracts; No Effect on Pepco Customer Rates,
Increased Value for Mirant, (Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.corporateir.net/ireye/ir_site.zhtml?ticker=MIR&script=415&layout=O&itemid=463100
(last visited Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Mirant and Pepco Reach Settlement].
45. In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
46. Id. at 311-13.
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of appeals. 4 7 As there was little possibility of the parties settling
this portion of the dispute, 48 Mirant accordingly appealed to the
49
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Mirant and the
bankruptcy court for two principal reasons. 50 First, Mirant's
abrogation of the entire contract constituted a breach under the
Bankruptcy Code, which is altogether different from a contract
alteration, something rightfully reserved to FERC. 51 The court
decided that any abrogation in this case would "only have an
indirect effect upon the filed rate," which does not go far enough to
subject the issue to FERC's approval.5 2 Therefore, jurisdiction lies
in the bankruptcy court. 53 Second, the court found that Congress,
in the creation of the Bankruptcy Code, laid out a number of
exceptions to the rights of a Chapter 11 petitioner to reject
executory contracts. 54 However, Congress failed to cite an explicit
statutory exception that gives special treatment to wholesale
energy contracts. 55 The absence of any such exception, proclaimed
the court, indicates that "Congress intended § 365(a) to apply to
contracts subject to FERC regulation."56 Whether FERC will bring
a petition to the United States Supreme Court remains to be seen.
C. The Conflict
The recent histories of these two energy corporations present
the issue of whether the Federal Power Act or the Bankruptcy
Code explicitly define the jurisdictional boundaries in their
respective fields such that courts will be able to determine who
controls in making the important decisions posed by the NRG and

47. Id. at 313.
48. Kristen McNamara, Pepco to Argue Power ContractDispute with Mirant
in May, at http:/Ibiz.yahoo.com/djus/040227/1213000730_2.html (Feb. 27,
2004).
49. Jon Kamp, Mirant to Appeal Court Ruling in Pepco Contract Dispute,
Dow JONES NEWSWIRES, Dec. 29, 2003, available at http://www.prophet.net/

quotes/stocknews.jsp?symbol=POM&article=20031229460_82bcOOOebfd64d12.
Mirant knew it had an uphill battle awaiting in the Fifth Circuit as the court
previously asserted the principle that the FPA gives FERC exclusive
jurisdiction over such contracts. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ala. Power Co., 824
F.2d 1465, 1468 (5th Cir. 1987).
50. See In re Mirant Corp., Nos. 04-10001, 04-10004, 04-10094, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16108 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2004) [hereinafter In re Mirant Corp. II]
(holding that the district court had jurisdiction to authorize the rejection of the
executory contract).
51. Id. at*16.
52. Id. at *18.
53. Id. at *23.
54. Id.
See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(d)(5), 365(o), 1110, 1113, 1169,
(enumerating exceptions to rights of Chapter 11 petitioners).
55. In re Mirant Corp I, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16108, at *24.
56. Id. at *25-26.
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Mirant cases. At first blush, the points of authority are not clearly
spelled out, and the court will have to explore the need to reconcile
one against the other in order to bring about a fair and just
Determining the appropriate result involves an
result.5 7
exploration of the statutory text itself, a court's duties when
presented with two conflicting laws, and previous court decisions
that might indicate some sort of precedent in this area, all of
which will be examined in Part III.

III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Text of the Laws

The issue presented to the courts involves a conflict between
two statutes. An obvious starting point for any court in resolving
a discrepancy in the meaning of statutes is the text itself.58 In
fact, courts have repeatedly held that the "first step in interpreting
a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain
and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute
in the case." 59 If the court decides that the language in the statute
is unambiguous, it assumes that the legislature intended the
statute to be implemented through the plain meaning of its
60
provisions.
1.

The FederalPower Act

FERC asserts its claim to jurisdiction from the Federal Power
Act, which requires a public utility to:
file with the Commission, within such time and in such form as the
Commission may designate, and shall keep open in convenient form
and place for public inspection schedules showing all rates and

57. See FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 304
(2003) (holding that "[w]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the
duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective").
58. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). This case involves a
plaintiff suing his former employer, Shell Oil Co., for retaliatory
discrimination under section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Id. at 339. While the issue presented to the Court does not involve a conflict
between two statutes, it is indicative of the means employed by the courts in
determining the rights granted by a federal statute. Id. at 340.
59. Id. In addition to a statute being unambiguous, a court's examination
of a provision ceases when the "statutory scheme is coherent and consistent."
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989).
60. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). This case
specifically held that once a court holds a statute's terms to be unambiguous,
then the "judicial inquiry is complete." Id. (quoting Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (holding that where statutory text is deemed
unambiguous, the court's examination of legislative intent or purpose is
complete except for a few "rare and exceptional circumstances")).
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charges for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, and the classifications, practices, and regulations
affecting such rates and charges together with all contracts which in
any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications,
61
and services.
In other words, all public utilities must file a rate schedule
with the Commission for any agreement contemplating wholesale
electricity service. 62 Congress found that delegating authority to
regulate entities involved in the transportation of electricity over
63
state lines was essentially "necessary for the public interest."
Therefore, the rate established by any contract governing an
interstate electricity service agreement is subject to FERC's
64
jurisdiction.
Once a rate has been filed with the Commission, a public
utility has no means of altering a contract relating to that rate
without FERC's approval.6 5 The Federal Power Act specifically
allows the alteration of an electricity rate through two different
means: (1) the seller may propose the modification, subject to
FERC's approval of its justness and reasonableness; or (2) FERC
may adjust the contractually negotiated rates if it finds they are
"unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential." 66
The purpose of this provision is twofold: (1) it allows FERC to
act as a "referee" in assuring that the rate prescribed by a service
contract is fair to the parties of the contract as well as the public

61. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c). The original purpose of this legislation was to
allow a federal regulatory agency to review proposed or agreed upon electricity
rates between a utility in the business of selling power (like NRG or Mirant)
and a buyer of that energy (like CL&P and Pepco). Borough of Lansdale v.
Phila. Elec. Co., 517 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The agency is
entrusted with the responsibility of assuring that those rates are not only fair
and equitable for the parties involved, but they also cannot contain any
anticompetitive elements. Id.
62. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 617 F.2d 809, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
63. Appalachian Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 630 F. Supp.
656, 662 (S.D. W. Va. 1986). Because Congress holds the power to regulate
interstate commerce, and Congress delegated the power of "regulat[ing]
facilities used for the transmission of electric energy from one state for
consumption in another" to FERC, then FERC can claim jurisdiction over
those cases in which a filed rate is "unreasonable" and adjust it accordingly.
Id. The "public interest" that FERC must use to determine a rate's
reasonableness is the interests of all fifty states, not simply the state or states
involved in the transaction at issue. Id.
64. Id. See also W. Mass. Elec. Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (explaining that even a contract that "relates to" those rates associated
with the transmission of energy will be sufficient to give FERC jurisdiction
over the contract).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d).
66. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. at 353. See also Papago Tribal Util.
Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that these
routes are available under sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act).
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in general;6 7 and (2) it functions to notify the public of pending
68
rate changes.
The plain meaning of this statute suggests that FERC has
exclusive jurisdiction over any alteration of wholesale electricity
supply contracts that are filed pursuant to the Federal Power
Act. 69 The legislature intended to ensure that rates spelled out in
contracts are fair to both the parties involved as well as the
70
public.
As the legislation is not dispositive on matters of complete
abrogation of contracts and elimination of contractual duties, it
does not appear that the legislature implemented the provision for
the sole purpose of assuring that utilities would not be able to
eliminate their contractual duties without FERC's approval.7 1 On
the other hand, the terms of the legislation do not limit its
application to certain instances or fact patterns. Instead, the
Federal Power Act explicitly assures its applicability to all rates
filed by any public utility; the statute lacks any qualifying
language.7 2 Therefore, it stands to reason that if a utility wanted
to alter a contract (and through the contract, its rates), it would
73
have to submit its request to FERC's authority.

67. See La. Energy and Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (stating that all rates proposed by "utilities for the transmission or sale
of electric energy [must] be 'just and reasonable"'). FERC's approval of these
contractually governed rates is dependent upon the seller's absence of "market
power in the generation and transmission of such energy[,]" and the seller's
inability to obstruct entry of any potential competitors. Id.
68. City of Groton v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1978). FERC
assures its ability to notify the public through the provisions in its regulations
that mandate providing notice of a rate change to FERC along with its wellId.
Written notice consists of filing a
established filing requirements.
schedule with FERC that states in plain terms the specific alterations to be
made to the existing filed rate. Fla. Power & Light Co., 617 F.2d at 812.
Subsequent to the filing of the schedule, FERC has the authority pursuant to
the Federal Power Act to conduct hearings to determine the legality of the new
rate and to suspend the operation of a new rate for up to five months if unjust
or unreasonable. Id.
69. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (asserting FERC's jurisdiction over "the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce ....). See also Fla. Power &
Light Co., 617 F.2d at 813 (holding that even though a FERC review and
subsequent decision is not subject to alteration by the courts, a court may still
examine whether FERC exceeded its statutorily delegated authority).
70. La. Energy & PowerAuth., 141 F.3d at 365.
71. Again, this is a reference to legislative intent, which seemingly dealt
with the benefit to the public by assuring rates that are "just and reasonable."
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)). While it remains true that the legislation
does refer to the modification of "[a]ll rates and charges[,]" it would appear
that modification or alteration are different, although not completely
dissimilar, from abrogation or contract termination. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
73. The proposition is consistent with the "filed rate doctrine" which
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2. The United States Bankruptcy Code
The federal bankruptcy courts claim jurisdiction over the
abrogation of contracts between Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petitioners and electrical companies through the United States
Bankruptcy Code. 74 Specifically, § 365(a) states, with certain
exceptions, that "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
75
debtor."
The essential purpose of § 365 is to allow a Chapter 11 debtor
to reject those executory contracts 76 that prevent the debtor's
solvency, while simultaneously forcing businesses that would
otherwise eliminate their relationship with the debtor to abide by
77
their contractual obligations with the debtor.
Similar to the broad based application of the Federal Power
Act, this piece of legislation appears to apply to instances
involving most, if not all, Chapter 11 petitioners.78 The Act does
make certain exceptions; however, none of the exceptions function
to subject a bankrupt entity's right to abrogate contracts to the
power of any other federal authority or agency.7 9 Therefore, by
looking only at the terms of the Bankruptcy Code, it would seem
that any bankrupt corporation has the right, subject to the

imposes a prohibition on regulated entities to charge rates that are different
from those rates that have been filed with the appropriate federal regulatory
agency. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981). The filed rate
doctrine was originally formulated by the courts in their interpretation of the
Interstate Commerce Act and has been expanded to apply to all regulated
utilities. Id. The rationale of the doctrine rests in the maintenance of the
agency's "primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates" as well as its
ability to assure that those regulated companies charge only those rates that
have been filed with the regulatory agency. City of Cleveland v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 525 F.2d 845, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 365. While this Comment concentrates on the ability of an
entity to terminate an executory contract, the Bankruptcy Code also provides
for the assumption of certain executory contracts codified in 11 U.S.C. § 365.
Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. The generally accepted definition of an "executory contract" is an
agreement in which both parties have failed to fulfill, in their entirety, their
obligations or duties as prescribed by the governing contract. H.R. REP. No.
95-595, at 347-50 (1977).
77. In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 954-55 (2nd Cir. 1993) (quoting
Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir.
1985), which held that Chapter 11 is used primarily to relieve obligations that
are preventing the financial stability of the petitioner). This section is also
used as "a means whereby a debtor can force others to continue to do business
with it when the bankruptcy filing might otherwise make them reluctant to do
so." Id. at 955.
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (governing the executory contracts of Chapter 11
petitioners).
79. Id. § 365(a).
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acceptance of the bankruptcy court, to eliminate its contractual
duties in order to maintain any sort of financial viability.8 0
Similar to the Federal Power Act, the Bankruptcy Code contains
no qualifying language that would subject its power to another
authority.81
On the other hand, there is a portion of the Bankruptcy Code
that assists FERC in its claim:
The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following
requirements are met ....

Any governmental regulatory commission

with jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, over the rates of the
debtor has approved any rate change provided for in the8 2plan, or
such rate change is expressly conditioned on such approval.
While this section in no way completely resolves the issue, it
does suggest at least a slight amount of deference employed by the
bankruptcy courts when subjecting debtors to Chapter 11
procedures.
The text of both provisions fails to indicate with any certainty
which authority would prevail in the case of an inherent conflict
similar to the situation facing both NRG and Mirant.83 Resolving
this discrepancy, therefore, will demand exploration of a court's
responsibilities when two federal statutes conflict.
B. Resolving the Inherent Conflict
When a conflict arises between the terms of two statutes, it is
the court's duty to consider each as effective unless there is a
clearly expressed intent of Congress to the contrary.8 4 The
Supreme Court has held that when two statutes provide "different
requirements and protections[,]" a court may regard each statute
80. Id. This premise is also contingent on the exceptions that are explicitly
laid out in § 365.
81. Id. § 365.
82. Id. § 1129(a)(6). A court's interpretation of this portion of the statute
may become essential in determining whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts
FERC's regulation of the rate change. Key, supra note 3, at 9.
83. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 1129(a)(6). Indeed, both statutes fail to explicitly
mention executory power contracts of any kind, the bankruptcy court's power
to abrogate a contract irregardless of a federal agency's asserted jurisdiction,
or FERC's authority over wholesale electricity contracts once one of the parties
has filed for protection under Chapter 11.
84. Nextwave, 537 U.S. at 304 (citing J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143 (2001)). This issue obviously does not
provide an example of preemption as the discrepancy involves two federal
statutes, as opposed to a conflict between a legitimate federal law and a state
law, in which case the federal law would prevail and the state would have to
defer its power to the federal statute. See Appalachian Power Co., 630 F.
Supp. at 662-63 (holding that Congress may preempt a state law by explicitly
asserting its intent to preempt state law, claiming jurisdiction over a whole
area of the law, or where the state law is in direct conflict with the federal
law).
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as effective.85
In examining the terms of the Bankruptcy Code and the
Federal Power Act, the statutes appear to take completely
different approaches to the alteration of contracts.8 6
The
Bankruptcy Code's requirements emphasize the elements an
entity must satisfy before asserting the protections provided by
the Act.8 7 Specifically, it allows the court to decide whether an
executory contract should be assumed or rejected, subject to a
number of exceptions.8 8
The Federal Power Act, on the other hand, establishes the
jurisdiction of FERC over the modification of rates in wholesale
energy contracts.8 9 The Act requires that any utility file an
application in order to modify a contract rate with FERC.90 The
requirements of contract abrogation according to the Bankruptcy
Code and the methods of contract rate alteration governed by
FERC
seemingly
provide
"different
requirements
and
9
protections." 1
Even if there are some similarities between the two
provisions, the court must still treat each as separate. 92 The
Supreme Court asserted its determination to give effect to two
overlapping statutes only so long as those statutes are applied to
85. See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 143-44 (finding that the terms of The Plant
Patent Act of 1830 (35 U.S.C. § 161) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (7
U.S.C. § 2321) did not conflict with each other because they provide for
different "requirements and protections" and can be read alongside one
another).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 365; 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) ( "In a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of
this title, the trustee may assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired
lease of residential real property or of personal property of the debtor at any
time before the confirmation of a plan .... ).
88. Id. § 365. One exception spelled out in the statute is that an executory
contract cannot be modified or terminated after an entity files for bankruptcy
even if a contract provision is conditioned on the insolvency of the debtor or
the instigation of a Chapter 11 case. Id. § 365(e)(1)(A)-(B).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
90. Id. § 824d(d). This section specifically provides that "[u]nless the
Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any public utility in
any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or
contract relating thereto, except after sixty days' notice to the Commission and
to the public." Id.
91. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 144. While this case did not involve wholesale
electric industry regulation, it did discuss the methods condoned by the
Supreme Court when confronted with two statutes that could be applicable to
the same case. Id. In this case, the Court held that each statute could retain
its effectiveness because of the "different requirements and protections"
analysis. Id.
92. Id. Applying both statutes with equal force to situations such as the
ones involving Mirant and NRG would easily create a heated contradiction
without a clear-cut winner. Therefore, courts must turn to alternative means
of resolution.
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distinct cases. 93 "[S]tatutes that overlap 'do not pose an either-or
proposition' where each confers jurisdiction over cases that the
other does not reach. 9 4
Redundancies between statutes are not unusual, and it is the
court's duty to give effect to each so long as there are no "positive
95
The court also must avoid
repugnanc[ies]" between the two.
96
renders it superfluous.
that
manner
a
in
language
interpreting
By examining the language of the two provisions, there
appears to be few similarities, but a number of specific differences.
Both pieces of legislation deal with the modification of contracts,
but the Federal Power Act specifies wholesale electricity service
Bankruptcy Code is more general in the
agreements while the
97
contracts it governs.
On the surface, the Bankruptcy Code deals with a company's
right to completely extinguish all rights and duties under a
98
contract subject to the court's approval, while the Federal Power
Act specifically mandates that changes to an agreed-upon rate in
an electricity supply contract must satisfy a step by step procedure
99
Despite these specific
in order to get FERC's approval.
differences, the conflicts faced by NRG and Mirant suggest that
the courts cannot give both statutes the same deference when
dealing with such a case. Therefore, this situation does mandate
100
that a court employ an "either-or" framework.
For an indication of which statute the courts will prefer, it is
helpful to look at how specific each statute is when applied to the
issue before the court. 10 1 When a court is confronted with two
statutes that it can apply to a single issue, and the results
obtained are potentially inconsistent, priority will be given to the
statute that deals specifically with the issue, rather than the
10 2
This
legislation that is more general in nature and applicaton.
principle of statutory interpretation appears to give preference to
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Germain, 503 U.S. at 253).
95. Germain, 503 U.S. at 253.
96. Id. The Supreme Court in this case made a point to recall that, when
dealing with a statute, "canons of construction are no more than rules of
thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in
interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon
before all others." Id. The Court, as expected, was referring to the original
words and phrases used by the legislature. Id.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 365; 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 365.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
100. See J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 144 (concluding that when courts are unable to
apply partially overlapping statutes to a distinct case because of the different
requirements, the court should employ an "either-or" framework).
101. In re Churchill Props. III, L.P., 197 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996).
102. Id.
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the Federal Power Act as it deals specifically with the energy
industry and wholesale contract rates. 103 Conversely, § 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code governs the rights of Chapter 11 petitioners in a
more general fashion.104
C. Other Means of Resolution
Besides exploring methods used by courts to resolve statutory
conflicts, it is important to look at other areas of the law that have
dealt with similar issues and the courts' ultimate resolution in
those cases. This will give an indication of not only the eventual
outcome of such a case, but also the means by which the court
reached its decision.
Courts have not shied away from their duty to grant power to
one federal authority over another. Indeed, in FCC v. Nextwave
Personal Communications,
105 the Supreme Court held that the
conflict asserted by the parties was no more than an
administrative preference.O6 "Such administrative preferences
cannot be the basis for denying [a party the] rights provided by the
plain terms of a law.' 0 7 Consistent with this opinion, a court
could find that the basis of FERC's asserted jurisdiction is solely
its "preference" for controlling the abrogation of executory energy
contracts, and therefore the bankruptcy court would have the
authority to abrogate the contract in furtherance of the
Bankruptcy Code without the approval of FERC.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court addressed a related
issue in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall.10
In Hall, the
parties entered into a service contract whereby the defendants
were responsible for providing the plaintiffs with natural gas at a
fixed price for a period of years. 0 9 The Supreme Court held that
courts do not have the power to alter or modify an agreed-upon
contractual rate that FERC already approved. 1' 0 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has even gone as far as restricting collateral
attacks on FERC-regulated contracts and rates.1 '

103. 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
104. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (governing all Chapter 11 petitioners and not
dealing with any specific industry or party).
105. 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
106. Id. at 304. In Nextwave, the Court found that the issue involves the
FCC's preference for "(1) selling licenses on credit and (2) canceling licenses
rather than asserting security interests in licenses when there is a default."

Id.
107. Id.
108. 453 U.S. 571 (1981).
109. Id. at 573-74.
110. Id. at 577.
111. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 375 (1988). The
Supreme Court held that while collateral attacks on FERC orders are
inappropriate, an aggrieved party may challenge a FERC order before FERC
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If the termination of the electricity service contract pursuant
to the Bankruptcy Code is perceived as an alteration of the
contract rate approved by FERC-which is very possible-then the
bankruptcy court would be limited in its ability to save a company,
such as NRG or Mirant, from financial ruin as a result of that
contract rate.
Yet the question remains whether any authority has the
ability to save those companies that find themselves in such
financially desolate situations. The Hall Court held that FERC
circumstances,
"lacks affirmative authority, absent extraordinary
112
arrangements."'
contractual
existing
to 'abrogate
While the relevant case law and statutes indicate a possibility
that FERC will prevail in these developing conflicts, there is also
authority available that will aid in the bankruptcy court's
argument. 113 Therefore, it is not clear which authority will
ultimately have the power to govern bankrupt energy corporations
that wish to terminate "harmful" wholesale electricity supply
contracts.
IV. PROPOSAL

The issue facing the United States bankruptcy courts and
FERC contains more questions than answers. The extent of each
authority's jurisdiction creates no evident solution, however, there
are important historical elements that indicate who should
The two most important factors to examine when
prevail.
answering this question are the policy implications provided by a
solution, and the legal ramifications created by that solution. My
proposal to this issue will address both of those elements, and
explain why FERC should ultimately decide the issue.
A. Policy Considerations
When addressing this subject, exploring the parties' interests
vis-A-vis the public policy implications of an eventual solution is
important because that solution has a definite possibility of
affecting the public welfare. 114 In the cases of NRG and Mirant,
itself or in front of a court responsible for reviewing the commission's
decisions. Id. This case specifically applied to individual state action and
prohibited states from modifying any FERC orders and substituting what they
perceive is just and fair. Id. at 371. Because the Court could not allow state
action to directly contravene a FERC order, it held that, when confronted with
a direct conflict, the state's regulation will submit to FERC's adjudication. Id.
at 377.
112. Hall, 453 U.S. at 582 (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747, 820 (1968)).
113. See supra text of Part III.A.2. (describing the specific provisions and
purpose of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code).
114. The resolution of this case could substantially impact residential energy
rates, which obviously affects the public. Similarly, while the successful
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the companies have an evident, self-serving interest in
maintaining, or rather improving, their financial standing if the
bankruptcy court was to prevail. As indicated, filing for Chapter
11 will facilitate this by ameliorating the financial strain imposed
by certain executory contracts.11 5 However, if FERC were to
succeed in obtaining jurisdiction, .and if it forced continued service
from both Mirant and NRG, the law would limit both companies in
their abilities to maintain some sort of financial viability. This
path, however, would provide the public with reliable energy
service at a consistent price.' 1 6
Companies like CL&P and Pepco have a substantial stake in
the outcome of this issue as well. Both entities are hoping that the
energy supply companies abide by their original contracts. This
will provide them with reliability and will also eliminate their
need to enter into another contract that could potentially have
adverse economic effects. If FERC prevails, the companies will
also have the ability to continue to provide reliable, cost-consistent
service to their customers. The interests of both corporations seem
to parallel the general public good.
Finally-and most importantly-the public has a definite
stake in the resolution of the issue at hand. Besides the obvious
implications of the purchasing price of energy, the most important
benefit lies in maintaining the energy service that CL&P and
Pepco have agreed to provide. While the connection between
power service to retail customers and wholesale energy contracts
seems tenuous, it still should maintain a heavy presence in the
court's eventual determination. If energy companies were granted
the right to terminate executory contracts every time they filed for
Chapter 11 protection,"17 then it would make it very difficult on
abrogation of the executory contracts at issue here does not automatically
indicate that residential power will go out or that it will be less reliable, such a
conclusion is not out of the question. An alteration in the supply of electricity
could alter the system, and such an alteration could end in disaster. If the
blackout of August 14, 2003 taught us anything, it is that the electricity grids
that we rely on so heavily are not immune to failure, and such a failure could
have disastrous consequences. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 31.
115. Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d at 954-55.
116. In its argument to the court, CL&P asserted that NRG should be
refused the right to terminate its contractual duties because it would place the
entire financial burden on CL&P and its customers. Motion to Intervene and
Comments of the Connecticut Light and Power Company in Support of FERC's
Jurisdiction over Filed Rate Schedule at 19, Blumenthal v. NRG Power Mktg.,
Inc., 2003 WL 21130626 (F.E.R.C. May 16, 2003) (No. EL03-123-000). Their
essential argument was that "FERC-jurisdictional contracts cover myriad
activities that are essential to the reliability and economic supply of electricity
to consumers." Id. at 16-17.
117. While this is by no means an everyday occurrence, it is evident that in
today's energy market more and more companies are finding themselves in
financial peril, and so they, too, will attempt to mitigate their financial
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energy suppliers to assure customers that they would continue to
provide them with consistent service at a steady rate.
The exploration of these policy questions seems to come out in
favor of FERC. While the function of filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy is an important means of alleviating the serious
economic problems facing struggling companies, it pales in
comparison to the public policy consequences that could emerge
should energy companies have the right to drop contracts on
demand. 118 Not only would wholesale energy consumers like
Pepco and CL&P be deprived of their ability to rely on wholesale
energy contracts, but it would also rob the public of its ability to
rely on the energy industry at all.
B. Legal Implications
While the preceding policy considerations should function as
an important part of the court's solution to the problem, the legal
ramifications are a priority in this discussion. As previously
119
demonstrated, there is no evident legal solution to this problem.
However, given the relevant precedent in various legal fields, it
would not be difficult to show that FERC should prevail when
exploring the legal considerations.
While I have shown that the text of both pieces of legislation
1 20
exploring the inherent
fail to indicate an express answer,
purpose of the legislation may aid in this decision. The Federal
Power Act, by its very name, invokes a right to supervise the
21
Its purpose includes
electricity industry in interstate commerce.'
the governance of the sale of wholesale energy and the rates
thereof. 22 Indeed, the Supreme Court has even granted exclusive
jurisdictional authority over the transmission and sale of electric

problems through the termination of harmful executory contracts. Such
contract termination could disrupt the balance provided by continued energy
supply.
118. "On demand" implies that energy companies would first have to file for
Chapter 11 protection, and then have their request approved by the
bankruptcy court pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
119. See supra text of Part III (suggesting that there is no established
authority in this field).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a); 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
121. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). The transmission of electric energy to the public
affects the public interest so much that federal regulation of the industry
through FERC is essential. Id. This is meant to "apply to the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at

wholesale in interstate commerce." Id.
122. See Northwestern Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 321 U.S. 119, 123

(1944) (holding that the FPA gives FERC explicit authority to regulate
contract rates). See also Borough of Lansdale, 517 F. Supp. at 222 (holding
that it is FERC's duty to examine proposed energy supply contracts and
determine if they are anticompetitive in nature).
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energy at wholesale to FERC.123 If it were to fail in its assertions
of jurisdiction over cases like this, FERC's essential purpose would
also fail and it would be subject to attack from courts of various
jurisdictions. 124 Indeed, its declarations and orders would carry
little weight if it were found to be subservient to the mandates of
any United States district court.
While the Bankruptcy Code functions to allow financially
floundering companies to obtain reprieve from their detrimental
contractual obligations, it by no means explicitly precludes any
sort of collateral governance over those financially desolate
corporations.1 25 Congress's express intention to deliver the right to
govern wholesale energy contracts to FERC would apparently
function as an appropriate means of providing a federal authority
with the right to govern the entire wholesale electricity sales
industry, as opposed to only those cases that do not appeal to the
1 26
bankruptcy court.
C. The Courts'ProperAction
When confronted with this issue, the most appropriate action
for the court is to favor FERC. Historically, Congress has properly
delegated some of its duties to administrative agencies, as they
have more experience and presumably more expertise, in areas of
general public concern. 127 FERC has the capability of providing
for the integrity of the legal field, the benefit of the energy
industry and its participants, and the assurance of public
welfare.1 28
Such a decision would in no way diminish the
123. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340 (1982). This
Supreme Court case confirmed that FERC's exclusive control over the
interstate regulation of wholesale energy transactions precluded any state
action that interfered with that authority. Id. at 344. The rationale of this
regulation, implemented in 1935, involved the limited ability of the states to
adequately govern wholesale electricity sales between states. Id. at 340.
124. Pursuant to the FPA, FERC's jurisdiction extends to "the sale of electric
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla.
Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 454 (1972). If the bankruptcy court were to
assert jurisdiction over this area, it would destroy FERC's established
jurisdiction.
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (asserting the right of a bankruptcy court to grant
the termination of an executory contract but in no way eliminating the
possibility that another federal law or agency will function to qualify this
right).
It seems counterintuitive that Congress would extend FERC's
jurisdiction to contractual rates while intentionally subjecting its ability to
govern those rates through bankruptcy law. As indicated earlier, there is no
qualifying language to this section of the FPA, so its scope does not appear to
be limited by the bankruptcy code.
126. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (asserting FERC's jurisdiction over "allrates.., in
connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy" (emphasis added)).
127. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 694 (5th ed. 2000).
128. See FERC, supra note 9 (suggesting that FERC's responsibilities and
oversight are far-reaching and encompass the legal and energy fields).
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bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction over all other cases involving
Chapter 11 petitioners; it would only allow FERC to maintain its
legislatively mandated position of authority.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the preceding exploration of this issue that
the decision of a court will not be an easy one. There are
numerous factors favoring both sides, along with numerous
reasons to doubt each side's right to assert authority over this
issue. The fact that the parties to each of these actions have
settled at least portions of their respective disputes evinces the
unclear nature of the issue. 129 Indeed, even the judges charged
with resolving these cases have appeared unsure and hesitant at
times to declare that one federal authority has a clear and
130
unequivocal right to adjudication.
While it may not seem helpful in the legal context, the most
equitable result often occurs when the parties to such a conflict
enter into a settlement that alters the terms of their contractual
relationship.1 31 For example, the agreement between Mirant and
Pepco, which resolved the first part of their supply contract,
satisfied a number of the important elements that this Comment
identified as crucial for the court to consider. It satisfied the
public policy considerations by maintaining the public's reliability
32
It also
on energy service while keeping rates at the same level.
relationship
allowed the companies to continue with their business
without forcing one party to bear the brunt of the financial
33
hardship.
The only court action that would come close to paralleling this
successful resolution is to allow FERC to determine the
appropriateness of a rate change and/or contractual termination.
Its expertise in determining what is appropriate in the energy
industry has the capability of providing financial stability, judicial
equity, and, most importantly, energy reliability.

129. Pepco, for example, decided to increase its payments to Mirant by $60
million for the two supply contracts because it did not want to risk losing its
pending court battle. U.S. Power Companies Suffering Contract Hangover, at
http:/Ibiz.yahoo.com/rf/031028/utilities_contractsl.html (Oct. 28, 2003).
130. See NRG Energy, Inc., 2003 WL 21507685, at *3 (finding both
arguments persuasive but eventually holding that "given the unique
regulatory framework for the business of selling electric energy and the
pending FERC proceeding, the [Bankruptcy] Court lacks jurisdiction to grant
[NRG's] requested relief').
131. When NRG and CL&P settled their dispute, victory was declared for
not only the parties involved, but also for the consumers. NRG to Continue
Supplying ConnecticutLight and Power, supra note 28.
132. Mirant and Pepco Reach Settlement, supra note 44.
133. Id.

